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Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Performance of Family Businesses in Cameroon

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RESUME :En prenant comme base les théories contractuelles de l'entreprise, l'objectif principale de cet article est de vérifier s'il ya un lien entre les caractéristiques du conseil d'administration à travers (la présence d'administrateurs indépendants, la taille du conseil d'administration, la rémunération du dirigeant) et la performance. Cette dernière est appréhendée par deux dimensions à savoir : la performance financière et la performance sociale. En constituant un échantillon de 50 entreprises familiales des villes de Yaoundé, Douala et Bafoussam, nous avons eu recours à l'analyse descriptive et la régression linéaire multiple. En générale nos résultats montrent que la présence d'administrateursindépendants, la rémunération du dirigeant influencent la performance des entreprises familiales, par contre, la taille du conseil d'administration n'est pas déterminante.
Mots clés *: Conseil d'administration, performance financière, performance sociale, entreprise familiale, Cameroun*

ABSTRACT:Based on contractual theories of the firm, this paper aims to verify whether there is a link between the characteristics of the board of directors (the presence of independent directors, the size of the board of directors,executive compensation)and performance. The latter, is measured from two perspectives: the financial and social performance. With an available sample of 50 family firms from the cities of Yaoundé, Douala and Bafoussam, the data were subject to descriptive statistics andmultiplelinearregressions. In general, our results showed that there is a positive link between the independentboard directors, the executive compensationand performance. But, the size of this board director is not critical.

Keywords *: Board of directors, financial performance, social performance, family business, Cameroon*

I. Introduction

The theme of corporate governance has taken on great importance in recent decades through a crucial concern on the part of politicians, business leaders, media figures and obviously researchers (Charreaux, 2008). It is involved in the management of global organizations, in the functioning of a state and also in the management of companies. Apparently called into question, it is most often not well defined, especially at the midst of family entities. From this, the governance of family business (FB) can be defined as a system of processes and structures put in place at the highest level of the company by both the family and the shareholders, to guarantee the best decisions concerning the direction, responsibilities and control of the company (Kenyon-Rouvenez and Ward, 2004).

Among these structures found at the top of these entities is the board of directors. Indeed, the latter, although considered to be one of the essential elements of governance, influences the outputs of the firm (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Thus, most of the research carried out is conducted in the context of large listed companies while the majority is mostly small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). It is recently that researchers and managers have also recognized that, the proper functioning of the board of directors in SMEs is capital because by creating value, these entities become sustainable. Family businesses (FBs) are the backbone of the majority of economies in the world thereby contributing extensively to achieving GNP, providing jobs and creating wealth (Beckhard and Dyer, 1983; Astrachan and Shanker, 1996). Following the same logic, Hoffman et al, (2006) believe that, the social and economic importance of family businesses is known worldwide.

It should be mentioned that despite the place occupied by this category of companies in most economies, especially in emerging countries, research work on their governance, in particular on the board of directors within the family business is little explored by most researchers. Let us note here some works by Madani (2010), Djimandjingar (2017), Mendy and Diop (2018). However, Cameroon has not remained behind, as an illustration, we can refer to the work of Obama (2013), MoungouMbenda and NiyonsabaSebigunda (2015), Kakti et al (2020), Wamba et al (2020). Although the research examining the presence of the board of directors within this category of company is not exhaustive and is considered to be in its immaturity stage (Huse, 2000;Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Some research points to the concentration of power, cultural identity, and ownership structure as elements that hinder the governance of these companies in Africa, in particular in Cameroon (NgockEvina, 2010; Obama, 2013; Ckouekam, 2015). On an empirical level, a good number of works that have focused on the characteristics of the board of directors have referred to the financial dimension desired by shareholders (AtanganaOndoua and Yogo, 2012), alongside other dimension of performance like its social aspect. This article seeks to fill this gap by associating the two aspects of performance with the same characteristics and on the same sample.

In this way, the objective of this article is to highlight the characteristics of the board of directors that influence the performance of family businesses (FBs) in Cameroon. Starting from the fact that in the literature there are several characteristics of the board of directors, we have therefore limited ourselves to: the presence of independent directors, the size of the board of directors, the compensation of the manager. Similarly, in the literature, performance being a concept with several dimensions in the context of our study, it is specified in two dimensions, namely firstly the financial performance that we measure by the (1) return on assets (ROA), (2) financial profitability (ROE), and (3) productivity. Second, social performance is measured by (1) working conditions, (2) care for sick employees and (3) good employee compensation.

To achieve this, this paper will be structured in 03 parts. The first part presents a review of the empirical and theoretical literature relating to performance in family businesses (FBs). The second expands on the investigation methodology used for the occasion and the last presents successively the results of the analysis, discussions and a conclusion.

II. Literature review

In this section, we clarify the concepts of board of directors and performance, then we recapitulate the empirical work on the theoretical bases of the relation between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance (financial and social).

I.1. The board of directors: key figure in corporate governance

Of all the many governance mechanisms, the board of directors occupied a central place in a company. To this end, it is considered as a management body whose mission is to define the strategy, make the decisions, appoint and control the manager.

The board of directors has several means of action to put pressure on the leaders. Thus, the onerous task of appointing and evaluating managers falls to the board of directors. For the leader who does not meet the expectations of the board, the board has the right to discipline or even dismiss him. The board also defines, on an individual basis, the remuneration of said officers. It can therefore use this discretional power to encourage the leaders to follow the decided strategic line. The assessment of the turnover on the performance of a company is made by the separation of the function of control from ownership put forward in agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Conflicts between shareholders and managers arise from diverging interests between these two stakeholders. For an efficient accomplishment of these missions, somecharacteristics ofboards must be noted such as the presence of independent directors, the size of the board and the remuneration of the manager. These elements have a positive or negative effect on the performance of FBs (Jensen, 1993). In the same vein, Godard and Schatt (2000)said that, the characteristics of the board of directors are supposed to better explain the performance of organizations.

I.2. Performance: a plural notion

Abundantly reduced to its financial dimension by reference to the profitability desired by shareholders, the concept of performance has been constrained to a simple facet focused only on the financial dimension (Bourguignon, 1998). One of the real challenges in the literature is to find a consensus definition for it in order to better measure it. Performance although being a complex notion for several years, we have moved from a financial representation of performance to a more global approaches which includes social, organizational and even environmental dimensions with the aim of giving three measures namely: effectiveness, efficiency and inclusiveness (AtanganaOndoa and Yogo, 2012). In order to better understand the complexity of this performance concept, authors like Kalika (1998), Kaplan and Norton (1993), Morin et al (2004) propose to integrate other variables such as mobilization of employees, the working climate.

According toHammani (2017) performance is a polysemous, complex and difficult notion to define grouping together multiple approaches. Under its financial dimension, performance refers to the survival of the company or its ability to achieve its objectives in other words, it is about financial resources at the disposal of a company. Social performance refers to the climate social as well-being of employees, and stress.

From the literature, many questions emerge as to the influence of family ownership on the performance level of the entity (Bauweraerts and Colot, 2013). Hence, the results that emerge empirically raise controversy as to the creation or destruction of value induced by family ownership (Bauweraerts and Colot, 2013). Long in the shadows, family businesses (FBs) have experienced a triumphant return in recent years (Allouche and Amann, 1997). Considered to be the most dominant form of organization in the world (IFERA, 2003), we find them in all forms and at all times. Besides, it is very dynamic with diverse organisational structures. It evolves and takes on different configurations depending on the age of the business and the number of family members involved (Barrédy, 2007). In addition, the family business cannot be defined either through specific legal forms or from a particular size (Ndongo Obama, 2013).

I.3.Impact of the characteristics of the Board of Directors on performance (financial and social): Summary of empirical work

In the context of this study, three elements were retained as characteristics of the Board of Directors; these are the presence of independent directors, the size of the board, and the remuneration of the manager. Performance begins on two levels, namely financial and social. We now take stock of this relationship from empirical literature and bring out our hypotheses.

From the corporate governance literature, several theoretical and empirical debates state the effectiveness of the presence of independent directors on the board of directors of FB. The agency's theory asserts that a greater proportion of independent directors results in better business performance in terms of financial and social performance. Several studies have found a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the performance of family businesses. Following this logic, Daily and Dalton (1993), Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995), Shehu and Mousa (2014) in their study suggest that there is a positive relationship between the presence of independent directors, financial and social performance. On the contrary, Makatiuska Cabrera et al (2014), found a negative relationship between independent directors, the financial and social performance of the family businesses. Hence the formulation of the hypothesis below:

H1: The presence of independent directors within the board promotes the performance of Cameroonian FBs

To this day, the literature remains very divided about the size of the board of directors that can generate more productivity for the company. By basing itself on the disciplinary theory of the agency, a small council is less expensive in financial resources and consequently increases the performance, facilitates the decision-making, avoids the coalitions which can paralyze its functioning hence resulting high financial and social performance (Caby and Hirigoyen, 2001). Conversely, the theory of dependence on resources is rather favourable for large board size within companies. For this stream, a high number of directors bring more knowledge and expertise favourable to the high profitability of the company (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Wanda, 2013). In the same vein, Godard and Schatt (2004) in their work showed the existence of a positive relationship between the size of the board and the performance of the business. This allows us to state that increasing the number of directors within a company is favourable to its profitability. However, Lipton and Lorch (1992), in their work concluded that a large board takes a long time to make decisions which increases communication and coordination costs and reduces the social performance of companies. From this theoretical and empirical opposition identified in the literature, the following hypothesis emerges:

H2: The size of the Board of Directors influences the performance of FBs in Cameroon

Conflicts of interest arising from the agency theory between shareholders and managers are sometimes sensitive to the extent that compensation plans are more directly linked to the performance of companies (André and Schiehll, 2004). In this momentum, the board should be more careful that the level of executive compensation is not excessive, which could have a negative effect on the performance of the company (Broye and Moulin, 2006). However, executive compensation can be a motivating factor for executives to make decisions that maximize company value (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).
The agency's theory opts for a positive relationship between executive compensation policy and performance. This position is explainedas follows: beyond the basic salary, shareholders can offer bonuses or even stock options in order to boost the manager in his functions which can promote the financial performance of the company by aligning the interests of the managers with those of the shareholders (Khenissi, 2013), However, Chow (1983) showed in his study that the remuneration of the manager does not influence performance within organizations. Murphy (1985), in the American context finds a positive and significant relation between the remuneration of the executives and the profitability of the shares and the growth of the turnover of the company.
This therefore allows us to deduce the following hypothesis:

H_3: The performance of Cameroonian family businesses is linked to the remuneration of the manager
All these hypotheses formulated will be tested in the second part of this paper. Before getting there, it is necessary to present the methodological protocol that we have adopted.

III. Methodological approach of the study

Before performing the analysis of the research results, we first present the characteristics of our sample and secondly we will deal with the operationalization of the variables used in this research.

II.1.Samplecharacteristics

Most of our study focuses on Cameroonian family businesses (FBs) with a board of directors. We administered a questionnaire to Cameroonian FBs in the cities of Douala, Yaoundé and Bafoussam because these cities are the most important but also, they bring together the majority of Cameroonian FBs and their general management. Of the 70 questionnaires administered, 50 were actually answered.

II.2Model and variable

Here we present the econometric model of the financial and social performance of FBs in Cameroon which is the independent variables of the study.We rely on a hypothetico-deductive approach because it consists of explaining, testing and verifying a certain number of hypotheses emerging from the literature.

Model 1: Financial performance PERF-FIN
PERF-FIN= $\beta o + \Sigma bkYk + \upsilon$

Where Yk is the independent variables; b_0, the intercept; bk, the regression coefficients for each of the k-independent variables, k (1, 2, 3) andυ, the random residue. The complete expression of the model is:

PERF-FIN= $\beta o + \beta 1Admind + \beta 2TAILca + \beta 3Renudir + \upsilon$

Where, PERF-FIN (Financial Performance) is thedependent variable; Admind (independent board members), TAILca (The size of the board), and Renudir (the managers' incentive scheme) are theindependentvariables.$\beta_0$the constant term ;β1, β2, β3, the unknown parameters and υthe error term. k=indexof the actor (i=1…n)

Model 2: Socialperformance PERF-SOC
PERF-SOC= βo + ΣbkYk+ υ

With Yk, the independent variables; b_0, the intercept; bk, the regression coefficients for each of the k-independent variables, k (1, 2, 3) andυ, the random residue. The complete expression of the model is:

PERF-SOC= βo + β1Admind+ β2TAILca+ β3Renudir + υ

Where, PERF-FIN (Financial Performance) is the dependent variable; Admind (independent board members), TAILca (The size of the board), and Renudir (the managers' incentive scheme) are the independent variables.$\beta_0$the constant term ;β1, β2, β3, the unknown parameters and υthe error term.k=index of the actor (i=1…n)
Several variables are used in this research. They are contained in two groups: on the one hand the independent variables and the dependent variable.

Table 1: presentation of variables

THEI NDEPENDENTS VARIABLES	DEPENDENT VARIABLE
-The presence of independent directors within the FBs -The size of the board of directors of the FBs -The remuneration of the managers of the FBs	The performance (financial, social) of FBs in Cameroon

We have chosen three indicators to measure financial performance, namely: ***profitability*** (*return on assets, return on invested capital*), and ***productivity***, and also three elements for measuring social performance, namely: ***working condition, the care of sick employees and the good remuneration of employees*** because these measures are appropriate to our study

IV. Analysis of results and discussions

This section presents, analyse and interpret the results of the quantitative study, specifically, we first carry out an analysis of the validity and reliability of the variables through the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO) and Barlett'ssphericity test. Then, we highlight the results of the analysis of causal linear relationships. Before we get there, it is interesting for us to present the results of the descriptive analysis.

III. 1.Presentation of the results of the descriptive analysis

This is to present the characteristics of the sample. This concerns the respondent profile on the one hand and that of FBs on the other. Regarding the profile of respondents, statistics show that among the 50 managers of FBs questioned, 26.6% occupy the functions of general manager, 28.4% are executives, 26.1% occupy the functions of accountant manager, 10% occupy the functions of administrative and financial director, and 8.9% occupy the functions of resources director. Among these leaders, 14.3% are women while 85.7% are men.

Regarding the age criterion, it emerges that 2.0% of managers are under 30 years old, 25.5% are between 30 and 40 years old, 67.2% are between 41 and 50 years old, against only 7.3% who are over 50 years old. Regarding the duration of collaboration with the company 6.1% have a collaboration period of less than 5 years, 85.8% of respondents have a collaboration period between 5 and 25 years, and finally 8.1% over 25 years. With regard to the level of education, it appears that the managers of the companies in the sample tend to have a high level of education because, more than 89.8% have a higher level of education against 10.2% for leaders with secondary level.

Regarding the profile of the FBs, it emerges from the descriptive analysis that all the companies in our sample are public limited companies (Plc), of which 81.6% with a board of directors and 18.4% without a board of directors. They work in several branches of activity such as 24.5% in industry, 36.7% in commerce, and 38.8%in services. Regarding the number of employees, it appears that 2.0% employ less than 50 people, 10.2% between 50 and 100 people, 6.1% between 101 and 150, 16.3% between 151 and 200 people and 65.3% employ more than 200 people. Regarding turnover 24.5% have a turnover of less than 5 million FCFA, 32.7% their turnover is between 5 million and 1 billion FCFA, 18.4% between 1 billion and 1.5 billion FCFA and 24.5% more than 1.5 billion FCFA.

III.2. Analysis of the validity and reliability of variables

The validity and reliability of the variables is measured using the kaiser-Meyer-Olin (KMO) and Bartlett sphericity tests of the variables.

Table 2: Results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and BARLETT sphericity test "Independent directors"

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling precision measurement.		0.875
Bartlett's sphericity test	Approximate chi-square	727.713
	Degree of freedom	45
	Significance of Bartlett	0.000

Source: Author based on survey data

Table 2 show the result for the variable “Independent directors”, the analysis of the validity and reliability shows that the KMO test is satisfactory with a value of 0.875> 0.6 which is meritorious. The results also show that Bartlett's sphericity test is significant (Chi-square = 727.713; P = 0.000). For this variable, “Independent directors”, our test is significant (p = 0.000 <0.05), we can say that it is an identity matrix within which all the correlations are equal to zero , which means that all the indicators of this variable are perfectly independent of each other.

Table 3: Result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olin test (KMO) and BARLETT sphericity test for the variable remuneration of the manager.

Results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and BARLETT sphericity test "compensation of the manager "		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling precision measurement.		0,668
Bartlett's sphericity test	Approximate chi-square	185,189
	Degree of freedom	6
	Significance of Bartlett	0,000

Source: Author based on survey data

Table 3 show the result for the variable “executive compensation”, the analysis of the validity and reliability shows that the KMO test is satisfactory with a value of 0.668> 0.5, which is acceptable. The results also show that Bartlett's sphericity test is significant (Chi-square = 185.189; P = 0.000). For this variable, our test is significant (P = 0.000 <0.05), we can say that it is about an identity matrix inside which all the correlations are equal to zero, which means that all the indicators of this dimension are perfectly independent of each other.

Table 4: Result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO) and BARLETT sphericity test for the variable size of the board of directors.

Results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and BARLETT sphericity test "size of board directors "		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling precision measurement.		0,655
Bartlett's sphericity test	Approximate chi-square	322,917
	Degree of freedom	55
	Significance of Bartlett	0,000

Source: Author based on survey data

Table 4 show the result for the variable“board size”, the analysis of the validity and reliability shows that the KMO test is satisfactory by displaying a value of 0.655> 0.5, which is acceptable.The results also show that the test of Bartlett's sphericity is significant (Chi-square = 322.917; P = 0.000). As in this board size variable, our test is significant (P = 0.000 <0.05), we can say that it is an identity matrix within which all the correlations are equal to zero, which means that all the indicators of this dimension are perfectly independent of each other.

As for the dependent variable, it is measured through performance (social and financial).

Table 5: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test result and BARLETT sphericity test for financial performance

Kaiser-Meyer-Olin test (KMO) and BARLETT sphericity test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling precision measurement.		0.518
Test de sphéricité de Bartlett	Approximate chi-square	452.901
	Degree of freedom	28
	Significance of Bartlett	0.000

Source: Author based on survey data

Table 5 show the result for the variable "financial performance", the analysis of the validity and reliability shows that the KMO test is satisfactory with a value of 0.518> 0.5, which is acceptable. The results also show that Bartlett's sphericity test is significant (Chi-square = 452.901; P = 0.000). For financial performance, our test is significant (P = 0.000 <0.05), we can say that it is an identity matrix within which all the correlations are equal to zero, which means that all the indicators of this dimension are perfectly independent of each other.

Regarding the social performance variable, it is summarized in the table below

Table 6: Result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO) and BARLETT sphericity test of the social performance variable

Kaiser-Meyer-Olin test (KMO) and BARLETT sphericity test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling precision measurement.		0.584
Bartlett'ssphericity test	Approximate chi-square	741.122
	Degree of freedom	120
	Significance of Bartlett	0.000

Source: Author based on survey data

Table 6 show the result for the variable "social performance", the analysis of validity and reliability shows that the KMO test is satisfactory with a value of 0.584> 0.5, which is miserable. The results also show that Bartlett's sphericity test is significant (Chi-square = 741.122; P = 0.000). As in this dimension "social performance", our test is significant (P = 0.000 <0.05), We can say that it is about an identity matrix within which all the correlations are equal to zero, which means that all the indicators in this dimension are perfectly independent of each other.

V. Research results and discussions

Now, we present an overall evaluation of the regression model by means of the interpretation of the significance of Fisher (F) statistic noted (sig-Fisher) and an evaluation of the relevance of the model, the goodness of fit of the data to the regression model and the explained variability of the regression model.

V.1.Characteristics of the Board of Directors and financial performance of family businesses

As in our output of the SPSS software, we have Sig (F) = 0.000 <0.05 then overall the statistical relationship between the independent variables represented by the presence of independent directors within the FBs, the size of the board of directors, the remuneration of the manager of the FBs, and the dependent variable the financial performance of enterprises (FBs) in Cameroon is said to be significant as shown in the table 7 below

Table 7: Analysis of variance (ANOVA)

ANOVA					
	Sumof squares	df	Mean of squares	D	Significance of Fisher (F) statistics (Sig)
Regression	534.311	7	93.473	190.707	0,000
Residu	70.689	43	0.700		
Total	1005.000	50			
DF= degree fo freedom			D=decision		

Source: Author based on survey data.

The results of our study between the explanatory variables and the variable to be explained the financial performance are designed below in table 8.

Table 8: Coefficients of the model

variables	parameter	Coefficients	Standard deviation	t Statisticsof STUDENT	Significance of STUDENT of statistics (sig)
The presence of independent directors within the FBs	β_1	+0,269	0,133	-2,030	0,045
The size of the board of directors of the FBs	β_2	-0,414	0,142	-2,929	0,004
executive compensation	β_3	+0,633	0,200	3,162	0,002
Observation n=50	Coefficient of correlation and of determination	r=0,964	R^2 - adjusted=0,930		
Dependent variable: Financial performance of family businesses (FBs) in Cameroon					

Source: Author based on survey data.

Regarding the relevance and the explained variability of our model, we can say that the statistical relationship between the independent variables represented by the presence of independent directors on the board, the size of the board of directors of the FBs, the remuneration of managers of FBs, and the dependent variable the financial performance of family businesses (FBs) in Cameroon is as follows:

-The presence of independent directors on the board within the FBs

The linear regression is said to be positive between the presence of independent directors on the board of FBs and the financial performance of FBS in Cameroon because the coefficient relating to this variable is positive (β = 0,269) and significant($Pr>|t|$=0,045<0,05) at a critical level of 5%. Concretely, this means that the presence of independent directors in the board of directors increases the financial performance of FBs in Cameroon. This means that there is a high probability that the company will perform well when within its board there are independent directors. This can be explained by the fact that, the independent directors through a more rigorous control can question the decisions of the leaders until they ask for the replacement of the leaders who are not performing. This result joins the work of Daily and Dalton (1993), Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995), Shehu and Mousa (2014) who suggested in their study suggest that there is a positive relationship between the presence of independent directors and financial performance. Our first hypothesis **H1**is validated

-The size of the board of directors of the FBs

The linear regression is said to be negative between the size of the board of directors and the financial performance of FBs in Cameroon because the coefficient relating to this variable is negative (β = -0,414) and significant ($Pr>|t|$=0,004<0,05) at a critical level of 5%. In other words, this means that the size of the board of directors has a lesser and significant influence in explaining the financial performance of family businesses in Cameroon. Whether small or large, board size cannot influence the financial performance of FBs. This result is in the same direction as those of Godard (2001), Rachdi and Gaied (2009), Mehdi (2014) and Vecklenko (2016). This allows us to reject our **H2** hypothesis.

-The remuneration of the manager of the FBs

The linear regression is said to be positive between the remuneration of managers of FBs and the financial performance of family entities in Cameroon because the coefficient relating to this variable is positive(β = +0,382) and significant ($Pr>|t|$=0,008<0,05) at a critical level of 5%. This precisely means that the remuneration of the managers of the FBs has a strong and significant influence in explaining the financial performance of the FBs in Cameroon. Thus, the composition of the salary (benefits in kind, bonus, and bonus) is a contributor to the financial performance of FB companies. This result confirms the hypothesis of agency theory that there is a positive relationship between executive compensation policy and organizational performance. Similarly, this result follows the logic of Murphy (1985), Khenissi (2013). For these authors, companies whose managers have high salaries and bonuses are the most efficient. This allows us to validate our research hypothesis **H3**.

V.2. Characteristics of the Board of Directors and social performance of family businesses

Regarding social performance, from our output of the SPSS software we have Sig (F) = 0.000 <0.05.Then, overall the statistical relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is said to be significant as shown in table 9 below.

Table 9: Analysis of variance (ANOVA)

ANOVA					
	Sumof squares	d.f	Mean of squares	D	Significance ofFisher (F) statistics (sig)
Regression	205.134	7	122.305	267.256	0,000
Residu	48.866	43	0.484		
Total	954.000	50			
	DF= degreeoffreedom		D=decision		

Source: Author based on survey data.

The results of the causal link between the independent variables and the dependent variable social performance are presented in the table 10 below

Table10: Coefficients of the model

variables	Parameters	Coefficients	Standard deviation	tStatistic of STUDENT	Significance of STUDENT (sig)
The presence of independent directors on the board of the FBs	β_1	+0,032	0,110	0,293	0,770
The size of the board of directors of the FBs	β_2	-0,309	0,118	-2,627	0,010
Executive compensation	β_3	+0,565	0,167	3,390	0,001
Observation n=50	Coefficient of correlation and ofdétermination	r=0,974	R^2 - adjusted=0, 949		
Dependent variable: Social performance of FBs in Cameroon					

Source: Author based on survey data.

From this table above, we derive the following interpretations

-The presence of independent directors within the board.

The linear regression is said to be positive between the presence of independent directors and the social performance of FBs in Cameroon, with the coefficient relating to this variable being positive(β =+0,032) and not significant($Pr>|t|$=0,770>0,05) at a critical level of 5%. This can be explained by the fact that the presence of independent directors within the board contribute to some extend in the social climate of family businesses (FBs) in Cameroon. Concretely, the presence of independent directors through their expertise (knowledge, know-how) within the board has the effect of increasing the social climate. This result corroborates with that of Shehu and Mousa (2014) from which the **H1** hypothesis is validated.

-The size of the board of directors of the FBs

The linear regression is said to be negative between the size of the board of directors of RUs and the social performance of family entities in Cameroon because the coefficient relating to this variable is negative (β = -0,309) and significant ($Pr>|t|$=0,010<0,05) at a critical value of 5%. Concretely, this means that the size of the board of directors is not a determining factor in better understanding social performance. This result corroborates with the work of Lipton and Lorch (1992), who said that a large board of directors takes a long time to make decisions which increases the costs of communication and coordination and increases the social tensions that exist between the stakeholders who coexist within the entity, reducing the social performance of companies. Hence **H2** is not validated

-The remuneration of the manager.

The linear regression is said to be positive between the remuneration of managers and the social performance of family businesses in Cameroon because the coefficient relating to this variable is positive(β = +0,323) and significant ($Pr>|t|$=0,007<0,05) at a critical value of 5%. This means that the remuneration of the managers ofFBs has a strong and significant influence in explaining the social performance of these entities in Cameroon because the bonuses given to managers can be a source of motivation, allowing them to create a favourable social climate between the different employees of the entity. This result corroborates that of Murphy (1985). The remuneration of managers is an asset for improving social performance in Cameroonian family entities.
Hence the confirmation of our research hypothesis **H3**.

VI. Conclusion

Our objective in this research was to analyse, by means of statistical tests, the nature of the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance (financial and social) of Cameroonian Family Businesses (FBs).
To do this we have illustrated it through analyses. After carrying out the tests and analyses of our hypotheses, we obtained several observations and results between the influence of characteristics board of directors and the performance of Cameroonian FBs. Specifically, the presence of independent directors and the remuneration of the manager influence the performance (financial or social) of the FBs in Cameroonian context. On the other hand, only the size of the board of directors has a negative influence on the performance (financial and social) of these entities in Cameroon. For future research, it would be interesting to pay particular attention to the characteristics of the board of directors and even to aspects specific to the family business such as the shareholding structure (concentration of capital, nature of shareholding).
The managerial implications of this article are twofold. On the one hand, the uses and understanding of the concept of performance are diversified and on the other hand, the inclusion of the social dimension in performance makes it possible to grasps causes ofgood or bad performance owed to social biases. However, our analysis has two limitations: The small size of the sample and the measurement of certain variables, which is not without reproach because not all the variables were taken into account.

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